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I. INTRODUCTION 
 We missed it. Like a slowly growing river as the snow melts in the hills, it grew 
from a trickle to a tide. Justice Alito was the author of the Opinion of the Court in 
Koontz v. St. John River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592, 186 L. 
Ed. 2d 697 (2013). Alito’s opinion represented a 5–4 split on the Supreme Court. 
This was interesting because the last two major water-related cases were 
unanimous—Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), and Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. (2012). Then came the Koontz opinion. Koontz was 
decided on June 25, 2013. At the time, I was working on an article on Sackett v. 
EPA.1 It was immediately apparent that Koontz was a significant decision. I also was 
immediately reminded of the concurrences that both Justices Ginsburg and Alito 
wrote in Sackett.  
                                                                                                                                         
 * Mr. Maguire is an attorney at the firm of Loomis, Ewert, Parsley, Davis & Gotting, P.C. 
in Lansing, Michigan. He specializes in real estate, land use, municipal, and administrative 
law. He is Vice Chairman of the City of Lansing Planning Board. He received his J.D. from 
The Thomas M. Cooley Law School. He received his B.A. in Political Science from Kenyon 
College. This article is dedicated to the author's grandfather - William A. Lawko, Esq. A first-
generation American, Mr. Lawko received his undergraduate degree from Cleveland State 
(then Fenn College) right as America entered into World War II. He enlisted in the Army 
though he was already drafted so that he could receive his diploma. He served honorably in 
the South Pacific theater. After returning to Cleveland, he attended night school at the 
recently-merged Cleveland-Marshall Law School. He was admitted to the Ohio Bar in 1950. 
He retired from active practice after over 60 years and closed his office on West 117th Street. 
He lives and instills the ethics of hard work and fighting for your freedom. Mr. Lawko is a 
living treasure, a wealth of knowledge, and reminder of what makes this country great. He is 
also a loving father, grandfather, and great-grandfather. The author owes him more and loves 
him more than can be put into words. 
 1 Colin W. Maguire, Sackett v. EPA Six Months Out: A Wide-Ranging Effect with an 
Uncertain Significance, 30 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 59 (2013). 
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In Sackett, Justice Ginsburg emphasized judicial restraint in addressing the 
overzealous actions of a government agency.2 Indeed, the Justices unanimously 
agreed that the EPA’s actions amounted to nothing more than unreasonable “strong-
arming” on behalf of the government.3 Justice’s Alito’s concurrence did not exercise 
such restraint. He argued that 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
allowed for such government behavior because “[t]he position taken in this case by 
the Federal Government—a position that the Court now squarely rejects—would 
have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees.”4 
With those viewpoints in mind when it comes to water and wetland issues, two 
significant cases came before the Court shortly after Sackett. Justice Ginsburg 
authored the unanimous Opinion of the Court in a case brought on behalf of the State 
of Arkansas.5 Arkansas claimed that temporary flooding of state lands by the federal 
government was a taking. Without determining whether a taking occurred or looking 
to Arkansas law, the Court limited its ruling to the proposition “that government-
induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings 
Clause inspection.”6 Justice Ginsburg specifically looked to the case-by-case 
approach affirmed in Tahoe-Sierra and championed by Justice Stevens.7 
This set the stage for Koontz. With Justice Alito writing the Opinion, the Court 
announced two holdings. First, government coercion in the form of conditional 
permits for filling wetlands does not “evade the limitations of Nollan8 and Dolan9” 
and could equate to a taking.10 Second, the monetary exactions required by 
government entities must meet the nexus and rough proportionality requirements of 
Nollan and Dolan.11 
What does this case mean for takings law? How did the Court come to extend the 
breadth of takings? Is this another blow to wetlands protection—a troubled and 
questioned area of the law in recent times through decisions like Sackett and 
Rapanos?12 The Opinion in Koontz has deep meaning, but it should not lessen the 
importance of water resource sustainability. This analysis will attempt to show that 
the environmental aspect of these cases is often incidental to the majority of the 
Court. This makes the impact no less real, but Koontz also may force us as a country 
to embrace environmental impact. This analysis will first focus on sustainable water 
                                                                                                                                         
 2 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374-75 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 3 Id. at 1374. 
 4 Id. at 1375. 
 5 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
 6 Id. at 522. 
 7 Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 342, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
 8 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 9 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 10 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595-96 (2013). 
 11 Id. at 2599. 
 12 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006). 
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resource policies—including the CWA—as a conduit for aggressive government 
action towards property owners. Indeed, the principal reason for disagreement 
among the “liberal” and “conservative” factions of the Court appears to focus on the 
motivations of government administrators—starting with Rapanos. Second, the 
Opinion of the Court in Tahoe-Sierra, as authored by then-Justice Stevens, created a 
strong divergence between takings inquiries based upon (1) government policies or 
(2) the land use of individual parcels—again, to create breathing room for 
government administrators in a case regarding water quality sustainability. Third, the 
analysis will examine a recent trend of bold government regulations imposed against 
property owners, and how resilient property owners have taken government 
administrators to the Supreme Court—with impressive results. Finally, this analysis 
will focus on how Justice Alito authored Koontz to set the tone on takings law in this 
era. 
In the end, both Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg had the foresight to 
understand the growing tension between property rights and government regulation 
of water resources in Sackett. Justice Ginsburg pled restraint, and exercised that 
restraint in Arkansas Fish & Game to address a policy creating a takings issue. 
Justice Alito took the next step and brought about a sort of backlash to Tahoe-Sierra. 
He was able to place individual parcel wetlands issues in the camp of Nollan and 
Dolan. It is no accident that the nexus standard in Dolan is so similar to the nexus 
standard in Rapanos, and now they are connected. In the cases leading up to Koontz, 
the Court surprisingly appeared to agree that government actors were exercising 
heavy-handed decisions in dealing with water and wetlands issues on property. This 
administrative attitude could have found some justification in Justice Stevens’ voice 
on takings issues in the preceding years. But Justice Ginsburg saw the problem with 
contemporary developments in water resource regulation and takings law. That 
problem created an opportunity which Justice Alito appears to have capitalized on.  
II. CLEAN WATER OFTEN LEADS TO AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS 
Significant sections of land in, around, and near oceans, lakes, and rivers are 
subject to the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7); this 
section of law states that the CWA applies to “‘navigable waters’ which means the 
waters of the United States.” The EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have a 
substantial definition of what a wetland is based upon what the term “waters of the 
United States” means, especially in their own interpretation of the CWA.13 But the 
breadth of this definition, as applied, was tackled head on by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Rapanos, and added a layer of analysis to the government’s 
definition: 
[F]irst, that the adjacent channel contains a “wate[r] of the United States,” 
(i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional 
interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous 
surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where 
the “water” ends and the “wetland” begins.14 
                                                                                                                                         
 13 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2013). 
 14 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742. 
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This means a government entity must show a “significant nexus” between the land 
and the “waters of the United States.”15 This language was the hallmark of the 
Rapanos Opinion. 
But the reasoning behind the Rapanos Opinion is couched in expansive 
administrative attitudes regarding jurisdiction on behalf of the EPA and Army Corps 
of Engineers. The Court noted that, unlike the jurisdiction under the CWA to protect 
against filling wetlands, the jurisdiction for directly polluting water extended to any 
source.16 Therefore, the Court felt it was a stretch for the government to argue that 
pollutants such as effluents would pollute water if the jurisdiction under the CWA 
was limited because other legislation addressed this concern.17  
The Court’s concern in Rapanos was caused by cases like U.S. v. Deaton—a 
2003 Fourth Circuit decision which illustrates a common example of how a private 
developer may run afoul of the CWA.18 In that case, a developer dug a drainage ditch 
in Maryland in order build a subdivision because an existing drainage ditch 
insufficiently drained the property.19 That existing ditch drained into another ditch, 
and then a stream, and then a river, and then the Chesapeake Bay—a trip of 32 
miles.20 After dirt was placed near the ditch, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers filed 
a civil suit against the property owner claiming that this was an unlawful discharge 
of pollutants into the existing ditch—a wetland—in violation of CWA 33 U.S.C. § 
1344(a) and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5).21 Therefore, violators get fined twice as 
much—$65,000.00 per day as opposed to $32,500.00 per day for violating a law and 
a federal rule.22 Prior to Rapanos, CWA jurisdiction required only a hydrologic 
connection between the wetlands and navigable waters.23 This allowed for 
government action like that in Deaton.  
As the conservative elements of the Court pointed out in Rapanos, government 
actors were focusing on the CWA and its language of wetlands “adjacent to 
navigable bodies of water and their tributaries,” and then taking the term “adjacent” 
and deciding that it “may be interpreted who-knows-how broadly.”24 The Court then 
chastised the dissent—composed of the more liberal faction of the Court, stating: 
It is not clear why roughly defined physical proximity should make such a 
difference—without actual abutment, it raises no boundary-drawing 
ambiguity, and it is undoubtedly a poor proxy for ecological significance. 
In fact, though the dissent is careful to restrict its discussion to wetlands 
                                                                                                                                         
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 743. 
 17 Id. 
 18 U.S. v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 19 Id. at 702. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 702–3. 
 22 Clean Water Act: Penalties, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region6/6en/w/cwa.htm (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
 23 Deaton, 332 F.3d at 712. 
 24 Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 748 (2006). 
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“adjacent” to tributaries, its reasons for including those wetlands are 
strictly ecological—such wetlands would be included because they “serve 
. . . important water quality roles” and “play important roles in the 
watershed . . . .” This reasoning would swiftly overwhelm SWANCC 
altogether; after all, the ponds at issue in SWANCC could, no less than 
the wetlands in these cases, “offer ‘nesting, spawning, rearing and resting 
sites for aquatic or land species,’” and “‘serve as valuable storage areas 
for storm and flood waters.’”25  
Again, the liberal faction of the Court cautioned restraint in interpreting the actions 
of government actors encumbering land through water quality efforts.  
The dissent looked to broad policy and a good faith belief that the government 
was doing the right thing in encumbering a private property owner. The majority of 
the Court did not share this thought-process at all, instead looking to the potential for 
government abuse of power: 
The dissent’s exclusive focus on ecological factors, combined with its 
total deference to the Corps’ ecological judgments, would permit the 
Corps to regulate the entire country as “waters of the United States.”26 
Interestingly, there are serious questions as to whether protecting wetlands the way 
wetlands are protected under the CWA is even effective. This imprecise regulation 
has caused many observers, and possibly even liberal Justices on the Supreme Court, 
to question the necessity of the government attitudes toward wetlands protection.27  
In fact, there is significant evidence which suggests that the CWA is extremely 
inefficient in providing ecological benefit, especially compared to the Clean Air 
Act.28 For instance, large parking lots are perceived as water run-off and pollution 
nightmares under the water sustainability principles; but they can also create a “park 
once” mentality in community members which leads to a reduction in overall carbon 
emissions.29 Plus, stormwater run-off from parking areas is manageable through 
water diversion techniques like the use of bioswales and permeable water detention 
areas.30  
But there is even criticism of the ecological value of wetlands mitigation—the 
policy used in Koontz—because many developed parcels have greater ecological 
value than the parcel substituted in mitigation.31 Others, particularly property rights 
advocates, have argued that there is a more subjective purpose in what is over-
                                                                                                                                         
 25 Id. at 748–49 (internal citations omitted). 
 26 Id. at 749. 
 27 Richard A. Epstein, Modern Environmentalists Overreach: A Plea for Understanding 
Background Common Law Principles, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 38 (2014). 
 28 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 21, 33 (2001) (citing J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE 
UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 101–35, 147–48 (1998)). 
 29 DEAN M. FRIEDERS, FOUNDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LAW, REGULATION, 
AND PLANNING 48–50 (ABA 2012). 
 30 Id. at 79. 
 31 Stewart, supra note 28, at 76. 
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regulation masquerading as water resources protection. Indeed, the presence of a 
wetland and government interest can “bring chills to developers’ spines.”32 In this 
sense, it is not surprising that the most significant takings case of the 2000–2010 
decade involved the protection of water resources from private development. 
III. TAHOE-SIERRA CREATED A CLEAR DIVERGENCE OF TAKINGS LAW IN THE HOPE 
THAT WATER RESOURCE REGULATION WAS TRENDING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
Justice Stevens wrote the Opinion of the Court in Tahoe-Sierra. Justice Stevens 
wrote the Tahoe-Sierra Opinion not many years after writing the infamous Kelo 
decision. What is critical to note is that, prior to Justice Alito’s arrival, Justice 
Stevens held the ear of the Court (particularly Justice Kennedy) on land use issues. 
This is not surprising given his background. Justice Stevens’ family was part of the 
prominent Chicago landowning and business elite in the early part of the 20th 
Century.33 Justice Stevens’ education on the campus of the University of Chicago 
ultimately made him a brilliant, constant experimenter with norms and judicial 
policy.34 But he also saw his family’s amassing of property wealth, followed by the 
Great Depression and the government taking his family’s businesses and properties 
into receivership.35 How this life experience impacted his decisions is unclear, but he 
certainly wrote Kelo and Tahoe Sierra—two takings cases with very different factual 
basis—from a unique perspective: a liberal jurist and the son of a staunch 
Republican businessman who lost everything to the government when times were 
hard.  
Tahoe-Sierra involved a series of moratoria on any development along scenic 
Lake Tahoe. Were these moratoria takings, and was that really the issue the Court 
looked at?36 The initial focus of Justice Stevens’ analysis was on the unique beauty 
and ecological character of Lake Tahoe.37 The water of Lake Tahoe was among the 
clearest in the world.38 It was undisputed that, in this particular case, significant 
development around Lake Tahoe over 40 years negatively impacted the quality of 
the water.39 However, it was also undisputed that the property value of the 
undeveloped land around Lake Tahoe was significantly impacted due to the 
government moratoria on development.40  
Of critical importance to the Court, was the fact that the landowners banded 
together in a single entity to challenge the nature of the government moratorium 
                                                                                                                                         
 32 FRIEDERS, supra note 29, at 112. 
 33 BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 21–
25 (2010). 
 34 Id. at 27. 
 35 Id. at 31. 
 36 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
306–07 (2002). 
 37 Id. at 307. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 308. 
 40 Id. at 309. 
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policy—arguing that the policy created a categorical temporary taking.41 Because it 
was agreed that the total economic loss of the singular parcels had occurred for a 
period of time, the landowners wanted the Court to apply the rule in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The rule in Lucas, which is 
tied to Nollan,42 states that an owner of a particular parcel suffers a taking when all 
of the owner’s economic use is idle.43  
Combining this rule with the possibility of a temporary taking was possible 
through the Court’s decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). While Justice Stevens 
agreed that First English was significant, the Court opined that First English was 
about policy and not about whether a taking actually occurred.44 Justice Stevens 
announced two completely distinct tracks for a takings analysis. 
Justice Stevens agreed that all takings cases originate from Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Penn Coal, Justice Holmes announced the 
rule that “if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”45 Justice 
Stevens also recognized the long-standing “whole parcel theory” from Justice 
Brandeis’ dissent.46 Justice Stevens reasoned that this meant that regulatory takings 
and physical invasions of property were distinct takings categories. Regulatory 
takings address the actions of a government in creating a policy which leads to a 
taking or series of takings. Physical invasions of property address a particular 
government body’s intrusion with a particular parcel of land.47  
Therefore, Justice Stevens looked to Penn Central Transportation Company v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) and First English as examples where the full 
taking of the individual parcel was not an issue for the Court. Justice Stevens 
reasoned that the only issues in those cases involved whether the regulation “went 
too far”—as opposed to whether the “whole parcel” lost value.48 Conversely, Justice 
Stevens reasoned that Lucas involved the “valueless” nature of a single parcel where 
a taking was declared at the trial court level.49 The rule in Lucas involved the loss of 
“all economically beneficial use” to the whole parcel.50  
This caused Justice Stevens to find Lucas completely inapplicable to the facts in 
Tahoe-Sierra—particularly because there were no fact-issues in the case involving 
individual parcels.51 Instead, he applied the Penn Central factor analysis for a 
                                                                                                                                         
 41 Id. at 323–24. 
 42 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 43 Id. at 1019. 
 44 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 328 (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 311). 
 45 Id. at 326 (quoting Penn Coal, 260 U.S. at 415). 
 46 Id. at 326, n.22 (citing Penn Coal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 47 Id. at 326–28. 
 48 Id. at 326–29. 
 49 Id. at 329. 
 50 Id. at 329–30 
 51 Id. at 330–31. 
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regulatory taking.52 But why abrogate Penn Coal into two rules when applying the 
rule in Lucas to regulatory takings could create an incredibly high burden for 
impacted property owners? Fascinatingly, Justice Stevens stated significant concerns 
regarding the decisions of government administrators across the board.53  He noted 
that First English addressed the issue of local governments taking the time to 
administer land use issues without running afoul of takings issues.54 Justice Stevens 
again cited the natural delay in the administrative process to create proper land use 
guidelines in order to sustain Lake Tahoe’s ecological value.  Justice Stevens opined 
that this is a well-reasoned principle which should apply broadly.55 This was 
consistent with Justice Stevens’ extensive dissent in First English which 
passionately argued that a government body’s administrative actions deserve 
significant deference in a regulatory takings analysis.56  
Sitting in the Supreme Court in 2002, deciding Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens’ 
argument makes a great deal of sense. First, there was not a lot of sympathy for 
multi-millionaire retirees who wanted to build their dream mansions at the expense 
of turning brown and muddy one of the most pristine lakes in the world. 
Furthermore, the “go green” movement was starting to gain mainstream popularity 
when significant programs like LEED® were unveiled in 2000.57 As evidenced in 
the facts of Tahoe-Sierra, Rapanos, and even in circuit decisions like Deaton, 
government regulators from the federal to local level were emboldened during this 
time period to aggressively regulate water quality. As Justice Stevens indicated, 
Tahoe-Sierra may have turned out differently if individual landowners came forward 
as they had in Nollan and Penn Coal.58 
By stating that only individuals can challenge per se takings while groups must 
challenge policy-based takings, Justice Stevens successfully added a layer of cost 
and litigation to one who seeks to accuse the government of taking his land. Justice 
Stevens is not only siding with regulators, but also betting that the regulators will not 
abuse their power and only target major sustainability projects. After all, a 32-month 
moratorium on development for dozens of landowners is patently absurd—unless 
applied to the rights facts. Justice Stevens’ distinction was clearly a decision based 
upon previous Opinions, but there was a risk associated with it. The risk was that 
government administrators would not act with unreasonable aggression in response. 
If they did, the Court might well make it far easier for individual property owners to 
assert a taking. That risk was realized in Sackett. 
                                                                                                                                         
 52 Id. at 331. 
 53 Id. at 329. 
 54 Id. (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 
(1987)). 
 55 Id. at 339. 
 56 First English, 482 U.S. at 329–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 57 U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/about/history. 
 58 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. 
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IV. SACKETT: UNREASONABLE BEHAVIOR FOR THE SAKE OF WATER AND JUSTICE 
ALITO’S DISCONTENT 
In retrospect, the decision in Sackett was foreseeable. The Opinion, in part, reads 
like a scolding from a unanimous Court. As previously referenced, the years 
preceding 2007 saw a mix of emboldened government water quality administrators, 
a highly-subjective attitude of administrators regarding rules and procedures, and a 
questioning of the effectiveness of wetlands protection in certain cases. Sackett 
involved one legal fact-issue for resolution: whether the EPA had jurisdiction over 
the Sacketts’ property.  
In 2007, Mr. & Mrs. Sackett were building their home on a parcel of land near 
Priest Lake in Idaho. However, several lots separated the parcel from the lake.59 The 
Sacketts filled their small lot with dirt for construction of their home.60 Priest Lake is 
a navigable water of the United States as defined under the CWA 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(7).61 However, the EPA found the Sacketts’ property was an “adjacent” 
wetland to Priest Lake and issued a compliance order against the Sacketts alleging 
they violated the CWA when they filled in a protected wetland.62 The EPA 
implemented a potential $75,000 fine for each day the Sacketts failed to comply with 
its order.63  
Worse, the EPA declined to hold a hearing on the issue because 33 U.S.C. § 
1319(a), unlike 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) and (g), did not explicitly provide for any kind 
of review.64 The EPA’s position that compliance orders under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) 
were precluded from pre-enforcement judicial review, as opposed to the definition of 
a wetland under the CWA as applied to the Sacketts’ property, fueled the litigation to 
come. In no uncertain terms, the position of the EPA was “comply so that you can 
appeal, or pay $75,000 per day.” 
The tactics and attitudes of the EPA did not go over well with the Supreme 
Court. A unanimous Court used the term “strong-arming” and derided the idea that 
the EPA could claim it achieved “voluntary compliance” with such tactics.65 But the 
EPA appeared undeterred, with an EPA official stating that it was “business as 
usual” after Sackett.66 The attitude of the government administrators in the case led 
to two completely different concurrences.  
Justice Ginsberg first wrote a concurrence which, by itself, read in an almost 
counterintuitive manner. In part, she wrote: 
The Court holds that the Sacketts may immediately litigate their 
jurisdictional challenge in federal court. I agree, for the Agency has ruled 
definitively on that question. Whether the Sacketts could challenge not 
                                                                                                                                         
 59 Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370–71 (2012). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Maguire, supra note 1, at 63–64. 
 65 Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1367, 1374. 
 66 Maguire, supra note 1, at 69. 
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only the EPA's authority to regulate their land under the Clean Water Act, 
but also, at this pre-enforcement stage, the terms and conditions of the 
compliance order, is a question today's opinion does not reach out to 
resolve. Not raised by the Sacketts here, the question remains open for 
another day and case. On that understanding, I join the Court's opinion.67 
Here is the odd part: the Sacketts were fighting for the ability to challenge the 
regulatory actions of the EPA—whereas the EPA argued this challenge was not yet 
ripe. But a challenge to the EPA’s authority in this case was inherently a challenge 
of the conditions and penalties. The penalties for not complying with the EPA’s rules 
were automatic once jurisdiction was established. Justice Alito, as referenced below, 
appeared to understand the significant issue which was dodged in Sackett—the 
breadth of the EPA’s jurisdiction under the CWA. To Justice Alito, there was no 
tangible distinction between the jurisdiction of the CWA and the aggressive tactics 
of individual water quality regulators. 
Again, the reason for Justice Ginsburg’s short, seemingly out of place 
concurrence, rests with a concern for the power of water a quality administrator to 
regulate water quality. It was beyond argument that the EPA administrators in this 
case “strong armed” the Sacketts through the use of jurisdictional keep away. But 
Justice Ginsburg expresses concern for the value of water quality regulation as a 
whole—as though the facts in Sackett were an isolated incident. However, it was 
well-established that this behavior was nothing more than the typical process of the 
EPA.68 
That was right where Justice Alito picked up his concurrence. It is worth taking a 
moment to consider perceptions regarding Justice Alito and his positions on the 
Court. At the time of Justice Alito’s confirmation hearings, he was considered a 
strong conservative nominee with support from leading neocons in the Bush 
Administration.69 Indeed, observers such as Professor Cass Sunstein researched 
Justice Alito’s dissents before joining the Supreme Court and found that Justice 
Alito was against “individual rights” in 84% of cases—many times on panels with 
all Republican-appointed Judges.70 Therefore, one might not pick Justice Alito as a 
coalition-builder. Indeed, his concurrence in Sackett advocates a step further than the 
unanimous Court is willing to go. But Justice Alito was also setting the stage for a 
future agreement among five of the Justices. 
In his concurrence, Justice Alito’s distaste for the EPA’s position was apparent in 
the opening line of this concurrence: 
The position taken in this case by the Federal Government—a position 
that the Court now squarely rejects—would have put the property rights 
                                                                                                                                         
 67 Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374–75 (Ginsberg, J., concurring). 
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10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/6
2015] ALITO’S VOICE 787 
 
of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) employees.71 
Justice Alito then decried the CWA as “notoriously unclear.”72 He noted that almost 
any piece of land that is wet for part of the year “is in danger of being classified by 
EPA employees as wetlands covered by the [CWA].”73 Again, the focus was on the 
decisions of administrators charged with water quality management. 
Next Justice Alito engaged in an analysis that should appear familiar to those 
who have read his Opinion in Koontz: 
The EPA may issue a compliance order demanding that the owners cease 
construction, engage in expensive remedial measures, and abandon any 
use of the property. If the owners do not do the EPA's bidding, they may 
be fined up to $75,000 per day ($37,500 for violating the Act and another 
$37,500 for violating the compliance order). And if the owners want their 
day in court to show that their lot does not include covered wetlands, well, 
as a practical matter, that is just too bad. Until the EPA sues them, they 
are blocked from access to the courts, and the EPA may wait as long as it 
wants before deciding to sue. By that time, the potential fines may easily 
have reached the millions. In a nation that values due process, not to 
mention private property, such treatment is unthinkable.74 
In Justice Alito’s reasoning, there are strong undertones of a takings analysis. He 
continued to analyze the breadth of the CWA jurisdiction that administrators 
interpret through reference to Rapanos.75 He then beseeched Congress to address 
jurisdictional issues under the CWA.76 
Justice Alito’s final thoughts in his concurrence were focused on the concerns of 
property owners. In the regime of water quality and control, he noted a significant 
amount of ambiguity and uncertainty.77 In this context, Justice Alito only referenced 
the CWA—a federal standard for federal agencies.78 But what about even more 
expansive state statutes, or other federal water programs? Would Justice Alito’s 
attitudes translate to a broader impact? The answer proved a resounding ‘yes’, with 
Justice Ginsburg offering caution the entire way.  
V. ARKANSAS FISH & GAME: THE WATER RISES IN 2013 WITH THE NEW ATTITUDE 
TOWARD TAKINGS 
Observers have noted a strong push by property owners—in litigation and 
advocacy—to thwart the actions of environmentalist and/or government agency 
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actions impacting private land. Both Rapanos and Sackett were considered 
significant victories for private property owners.79 The year 2013 may stand as the 
year of the private property owner in modern Supreme Court history. 
Though technically decided on December 4, 2012, Arkansas Fish & Game 
Commission v. U.S. kicked off the year with a victory for property owners. 
Interestingly, the property owner who brought the claim also happened to be a state 
agency.80 Still, the decision impacts all property owners.  
Interestingly, the case arose because the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was 
heeding the wishes of private farmers who had requested that the Corps not release 
run-off from the Black River onto their lands.81 Instead, the Corps deviated from its 
normal plan and ran the water in such a way as to flood state land. The state took 
exception and sued for a temporary taking of its land.82 Hunters frequently used this 
land—which lost all of its value to the public during these flooding periods and 
caused economic damage to the state agency.83 The federal circuit found that there 
was no temporary taking for government flooding of lands.84 Critically, the issue 
before the Supreme Court was whether a government policy of intentional flooding 
could constitute a temporary taking, not whether a taking had occurred—with 
specific reference to First English.85 
Writing the Opinion of the Court, Justice Ginsburg quickly dispatched the idea 
that temporary federal flooding was not a potential taking: 
Tellingly, the Government qualifies its defense of the Federal Circuit's 
exclusion of flood invasions from temporary takings analysis. It sensibly 
acknowledges that a taking might be found where there is a “sufficiently 
prolonged series of nominally temporary but substantively identical 
deviations.” This concession is in some tension with the categorical rule 
adopted by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, once it is recognized that at least 
some repeated nonpermanent flooding can amount to a taking of property, 
the question presented to us has been essentially answered. Flooding 
cases, like other takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the 
“particular circumstances of each case,” and not by resorting to blanket 
exclusionary rules.86 
Because the case at bar was policy-driven, without a specific whole parcel analysis 
before the Court, the Penn Central-First English-Tahoe-Sierra analysis applied to 
Arkansas Game & Fish. Justice Ginsburg immediately qualified the Opinion to keep 
open the issue of whether a government temporary taking required intent—noting 
                                                                                                                                         
 79 See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 908 
(2013). 
 80 Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 512–13 (2012). 
 81 Id. at 513. 
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this issue was not addressed at the court of appeals and so the Court could not hear 
it.87 
Arkansas Fish & Game was another unanimous Opinion of the Court. Like in 
Sackett, unanimity was gained through a narrow Opinion. Again, the Court 
specifically refused to go down the path of Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan: 
For the same reason, we are not equipped to address the bearing, if any, of 
Arkansas water-rights law on this case. The determination whether a 
taking has occurred includes consideration of the property owner's distinct 
investment-backed expectations, a matter often informed by the law in 
force in the State in which the property is located. But Arkansas law was 
not examined by the Federal Circuit, and therefore is not properly pursued 
in this Court.88  
So what did the Court decide? The Court ruled “simply and only, that government-
induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings 
Clause inspection.”89 Referencing Tahoe-Sierra, the Court then reaffirmed that time 
is a factor in assessing a temporary taking.90 Justice Ginsburg again looked to the 
somewhat nebulous Penn Central test for assessing government policies as opposed 
to direct government actions. This was similar to her unique concurrence in Sackett, 
which attempted to couch the issue purely in a government policy and not the actions 
of the government actors. 
Reactions to Arkansas Fish & Game were mixed. It was widely acknowledged 
that no major step was taken in the realm of takings law.91 However, it was also 
noted that the Court had unanimously agreed with property owners—perhaps a 
significant outcome.92 But maybe the more significant accomplishment was that the 
Court unanimously agreed with property owners in both Sackett and Arkansas Fish 
& Game. Both cases involved government actors and water regulation. In both cases, 
it proved difficult for the government actors to objectively explain why the actions of 
the governments were utterly free from legal challenges and reasonable examination.  
Contrary to Justice Ginsburg’s tone in her Concurrence in Sackett and her 
Opinion in Arkansas Fish & Game, both cases featured government actors’ actions 
in the context of water regulation. After all, the policies challenged in those cases 
existed long before those policies were challenged. So, what changed over the years 
to alter government attitudes and actions? The explanation may prove as straight-
forward as physics—for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.93 The 
Court, through Justice Stevens, decided Kelo and Tahoe-Sierra to embolden 
government administrators. By all appearances, that has led to the aggressive 
reactions of property owners in litigation. 
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As some like Professor Richard Epstein further argue, government attitudes 
toward wetlands and water management create a haven for government abuse and 
behavior our society generally abhors: 
Yet under the current law, behavior that is unconscionable in the private 
sphere seems acceptable to government actors who regard themselves as 
wholly unconstrained by any concerns with private property or with 
demonstrating the imminence of any potential harms. Further, there is no 
noneconomic value that justifies the government beating up small people 
by threatening them with overwhelming fines if they dare challenge a 
government edict. The government action from start to finish was ugly 
and odious and should be condemned by all people on all sides of any 
legitimate environmental dispute.94 
Whether individual government regulators take their regulations personally, it is 
difficult for the average real property owner not to have a strong, personal 
connection with any property use dispute. 
The Takings Clause has always provided a “psychological lift” to property 
owners, if not always an actual remedy in a court.95 Starting at Rapanos, and picking 
up significant steam in 2012–2013, property owners have forced the Supreme Court 
to define and redefine their rights in the context of water management regulations.96 
Furthermore, property owners value an economic analysis of all property issues.97 
This often puts them at odds with regulators, who, at least publicly, attribute their 
values to ecological motivations. Property owners have created a steady stream of 
litigation which always includes either representation or amicus briefs from groups 
who traditionally support property owners such as The Cato Institute, The Heritage 
Foundation, Institute for Justice, and the Pacific Legal Institute. Again, the 
distinction between a “policy” takings analysis and a “parcel” takings analysis is that 
Penn Central is problematic if the ultimate goal is to support government regulators. 
A clever jurist like Justice Alito will find enough populist support to make a “parcel” 
takings analysis easier to win for the property owner.  
Why? Because the narrative of CWA regulation and water-related takings is a 
frightening one for almost anyone who is not a government regulator. It is a narrative 
of government tyranny predicted and reinforced through repetitive litigation. Though 
the liberal faction of the Court worries on ecological principle, the conservative 
faction of the Court has proven that—in the context of water regulation—
government accountability and objectivity is highly questionable. Maybe 
government regulation of water resources is not as aggressive as the recent Supreme 
Court cases depict; but perception becomes reality when the Court issues a 
significant Opinion.  
There is no more Justice Stevens on the Court. He was the leading force of 
property owner-government cases, acquiring the ear and signature of Justice 
Kennedy in both 2002’s Tahoe-Sierra and 2006’s infamous Kelo. Indeed, the “right 
bloc” of the Court has come together on many issues—some would say with 
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14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss4/6
2015] ALITO’S VOICE 791 
 
destructive intentions toward precedent-setting decisions.98 Surely, Justice Alito 
wrote the Opinion in Koontz using Tahoe-Sierra as a weapon against Justice 
Stevens’ interests related to insulating government regulators. But it is fair to say 
that the reasoning in Koontz logically builds off the reasoning in Tahoe-Sierra—a 
case where Justice Stevens found support from Justice Kennedy. Therefore, this is 
more of an example of Justice Alito’s tone and reasoning carrying the day as a leader 
on property rights and water regulation issues.  
Still, one can understand the concern of liberal jurists because the concepts 
presented in Koontz, as foreshadowed in Sackett, cast doubt upon all the motivations 
of all government water regulation. Therefore, it is hardly a surprise that the federal 
government filed a special amicus brief in Koontz; or that the Pacific Legal 
Foundation—the Sacketts’ counsel before the Court a year earlier—represented the 
property owner in Koontz.99 
VI. JUSTICE ALITO BRINGS THE PRO-PROPERTY OWNERS’ MOMENTUM FULL CIRCLE 
IN KOONTZ 
In Koontz, Justice Alito laid out the general Penn Central test.100 He listed the 
balancing test factors when assessing the government regulation such as “character” 
and “economic impact.”101 But as Justice Stevens pointed out in Tahoe-Sierra, 
Justice Alito recited that parcel-specific government actions, such as exactions, were 
different.102 These government actions are viewed through the lens of Nollan and 
Dolan—even Lucas falls into this camp because of Stevens’ Opinion in Tahoe-
Sierra.103 As Justice Alito announced, the protections of Nollan and Dolan apply to 
any government restriction which does not have a substantial nexus and rough 
proportionality to the restricted development.104 
With that line of thinking, the Court examined a situation where private 
developer Koontz looked to develop the northern 3.7 acres of his 14.9 acre property 
outside of Orlando, Florida.105 The southern section of the property featured a small 
creek and assorted wetlands. Further, standing water was found in and around the 
power lines which bisected the property east to west. There was also a drainage ditch 
on the western edge of the property.106 The developer proposed deeding the 11 
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southern acres of the property as a conservation easement to the St. John River 
Water Management District—the government water and wetlands regulator for that 
region of Florida.107 Because the development would impact land that “draws water 
from, drains into, or is placed into the waters of the state” under Fla. Stat. § 
373.403(5), the regulator had to approve a permit in order for the project to go 
forward.108  
The regulator found the easement inadequate. Instead, the regulator offered two 
conditions to the developer before the developer granted the permit: 
First, the District proposed that petitioner reduce the size of his 
development to 1 acre and deed to the District a conservation easement on 
the remaining 13.9 acres. To reduce the development area, the District 
suggested that petitioner could eliminate the dry-bed pond from his 
proposal and instead install a more costly subsurface stormwater 
management system beneath the building site. The District also suggested 
that petitioner install retaining walls rather than gradually sloping the land 
from the building site down to the elevation of the rest of his property to 
the south. 
 
In the alternative, the District told petitioner that he could proceed with 
the development as proposed, building on 3.7 acres and deeding a 
conservation easement to the government on the remainder of the 
property, if he also agreed to hire contractors to make improvements to 
District-owned land several miles away. Specifically, petitioner could pay 
to replace culverts on one parcel or fill in ditches on another. Either of 
those projects would have enhanced approximately 50 acres of District-
owned wetlands. When the District asks permit applicants to fund offsite 
mitigation work, its policy is never to require any particular offsite 
project, and it did not do so here. Instead, the District said that it “would 
also favorably consider” alternatives to its suggested offsite mitigation 
projects if petitioner proposed something “equivalent.”109 
The Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit sided with the developer in 
the ensuing litigation—finding that the regulator had unlawfully imposed upon the 
developer’s land based upon Nollan and Dolan. However, the Florida Supreme 
Court sided with the regulator.110 Justice Alito’s unmistakable tone toward water 
resource regulators shone through again in his analysis of the procedural history: 
The Florida Supreme Court blessed this maneuver and thus effectively 
interred those important decisions. Because we conclude that Nollan and 
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Dolan cannot be evaded in this way, the Florida Supreme Court's decision 
must be reversed.111 
The regulator relied on the long-standing law in Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In short, the regulator argued that the developer should 
tolerate the cost of good land use policy.112 But Justice Alito instructed that Village 
of Euclid is tempered through the realities explored in Nollan and Dolan. In short, 
the government regulator had to show that there was a substantial nexus and rough 
proportionality between the development and the regulator’s demands.113 
The Supreme Court found no substantial nexus or rough proportionality between 
developing Koontz’s small wetland parcel and paying money to improve the 
completely distinct parcel which the regulator owned. This was decided even though 
no land was necessarily taken, but rather that it could have been taken if the 
regulator was not challenged.114 Then Justice Alito hit on a fascinating point that 
may have many implications. He notes that the regulator is correct to say that 
offering to only develop one acre of the land was not a taking under Nollan and 
Dolan.115 However, the act of offering the unsupported mitigation in exchange for 
2.7 more developable acres was a taking under Nollan and Dolan. Therefore, only 
2.7 acres were taken because 1 acre could have proven a reasonable outcome. It was 
the overreaching act of the water and wetland regulator that caused the taking.116  
Justice Alito’s reasoning appears to bring Nollan, Dolan, and the whole parcel 
theory in Penn Coal into close proximity. The whole taken parcel is that which is 
encumbered by an unreasonable condition, even if the taken property is overlaid by 
untaken property. Again, it is the step too far from the water regulator that brought 
the wrath of the Court. The law itself was not unreasonable, having existed since 
1972—the very year Koontz purchased the property in question.117 Nollan was a 
1987 case Dolan from 1994. What changed? Was it an attitude in society, an attitude 
in the Court, or both?  
Perhaps Justice Stevens believed in the decency of regulation juxtaposed against 
the arbitrary whims of private property owners. He extolled the values of planning 
and the collective community interest in Kelo. He added a layer of environmental 
concerns in Tahoe-Sierra. Since Justice Stevens’ retirement, his successors lack the 
dynamic ability to rally a majority to his view in this area of the law. Yet when you 
read the facts of Sackett, Arkansas Fish & Game, and Koontz, where are the 
sympathetic facts for the regulator? The sympathy is nowhere in the facts of these 
recent cases. The regulator is “in the wrong” in the court of law and the court of 
public opinion. But is this because the regulator’s policy is inherently unjust? 
Absolutely not. Rather, the vitriol toward water and wetlands regulators comes from 
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the mutually connected concepts that: (1) regulators want to make a true difference 
in water quality; and (2) they insist that it is the landowner who exclusively must pay 
in order to achieve that goal. 
The process environmental regulators, particularly water quality regulators, use 
with landowners is a system of exactions which many consider unjustifiable, and “an 
absolute abuse of government power.”118 Again, Professor Epstein frames the issue 
very well when he states: 
The recent case of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District 
comes to mind. That case tried to get around the notion that the state must 
pay for what it wants to take by inventing a very large notion of “harm,” 
and then announcing that some duty of environmental mitigation shall be 
imposed upon all landowners who have the temerity to want to build on 
their own land without creating a nuisance to anybody. The performance 
on every side of this particular argument was lamentably incompetent in 
terms of the way in which it was organized. 
 
At the beginning of oral argument, Justice Sotomayor and Justice 
Ginsburg asked bluntly if the plaintiff wished to challenge the doctrine of 
environmental mitigation, to which the lawyer said no. That was the first 
mistake. What the lawyer should have said is, “Yes, there is no more 
pernicious doctrine in the entire armory of environmental law than that 
one because it upsets the proper relationship of private property to the 
state.” What is the danger in this case? It lies in the ad hoc view that the 
government somehow owns an environmental easement over all property, 
which it will waive only if private individuals engage in acts of 
environmental mitigation.119 
From a policy standpoint, this is what regulators might take away from this case: pay 
for what you want like everyone else.120 This entire analysis of the attitudes and 
boldness of water quality regulators has ultimately become an issue of cost. Why? 
Because the issue of water regulation is, to the landowner, an economic one. The 
sustainability and quality of water resources are societal demands, and yet society—
as represented through the actions of the regulators in Koontz—believes that it is not 
society’s responsibility to shoulder the burden. Instead, society can pay regulators to 
force landowners to spend significantly more than the regulator’s salary. It is a net-
positive investment for the regulatory unit; it is also wildly unfair government 
activity which is guarded against under the Constitution. From a public policy 
standpoint, wetlands mitigation as displayed in Koontz is also inappropriate because 
it misses the point of mass sustainability—the commitment of the masses. 
The economic analysis of Justice Alito’s Opinion in Koontz is probably the most 
broad and impactful take away—even strictly monetary exactions, whether for the 
improvement of public or private land, “must satisfy the nexus and rough 
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”121 Because money and 
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regulations are omnipresent in land development, especially near water, it stands to 
reason that the Nollan and Dolan test will be applied to many more local, state, and 
federal government regulations. As applied, the legal analysis will shine a bright, 
revealing light on the government actor’s underlying policy goals for a regulation 
and whether those goals are applied in a way that establishes a substantial nexus and 
rough proportionality—even when the regulation is a condition to obtaining a 
permit. Indeed, Justice Alito’s Opinion seems to reinforce the legal maxim that the 
law will not tolerate such evasions of its power. 
 Professor Epstein, again, certainly supports this line of thinking as the proper 
solution to the problem of preserving ecological treasures: 
The only way the law achieves this end is to demand that the government 
unbundle the development rights from the exaction and thereby insist that 
the state pay for what it wants. The Koontz situation is another illustration 
of government cheap talk; if the Management Board had to pay to take 
over these development rights, it would have resorted to general tax 
revenues to finance its purchase of the development rights.122 
Broken down to its bare bones, wetlands mitigation is an economic proposition. 
Many times, the response to regulation is that the cost is passed on to the consumer. 
In turn, society then has to pay more and somehow this balances out the property 
owner’s extra expense. But that thinking is faulty in the context of wetlands and 
water quality. For instance, if a more expensive window is required on a new 
building due to regulations, then that cost might be factored into the cost of leasing 
that building. However, the building is still leased; in theory, the occupant benefits 
directly from the expensive window. Therefore, the owner can pass along the cost of 
the expensive window. 
 This is not true when deciding whether a developer can even develop certain 
parts of land. When faced with the coercive choice to develop 3.7 as opposed to 1 
acre of land, having 1 acre of developable land does not make the property more 
profitable than if 3.7 acres were developed. A developer cannot turn around and say 
to a potential occupant I will charge you 3.7 times a marketable lease rate because 
you are benefitting from my not developing the surrounding 2.7 acres—especially 
when the surrounding dozen acres are undeveloped. That potential occupant would 
likely think the developer was insane. Instead, the benefit of not developing the 2.7-
acre remainder lies with the community as a whole. Therefore, it logically follows 
that the community should pay the cost of not developing this land.  
This new attitude may force difficult, but critical, community land acquisition 
decisions. Perhaps this type of attitude would stimulate more cooperative processes 
leading to development agreements of land donations in exchange for tax write-offs. 
Rather than start a conflict over a potential taking, or seek significant public funding 
to create riparian buffers, property owners and governments could work together 
toward a mutually positive economic and ecological outcome. Koontz has the 
potential to usher in a new era or property owner rights, but will it? 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 That is the question which lingers over Koontz—does it actually mean anything 
for communities and local regulators? What practical conclusions can we draw from 
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the Opinion? Here is what we do know: (1) Nollan and Dolan apply whether a 
permit is denied or approved with conditions; and (2) there is no substantial 
distinction between a physical government invasion and a coercive request for funds, 
if the government action fails under Nollan and Dolan.123 Clearly, there is a newly-
recognized risk to water resource regulators who try to stop development in areas 
which are considered wetlands. 
Still, why develop most or any of those areas at all? Consider the case of New 
Jersey’s reaction to Hurricane Sandy.124 The State reacted to this crisis by creating 
programs which encourage individuals to relocate buildings further from regulated 
waters and requiring buildings to be constructed at higher elevations—there was 
even assistance for the purchase of unusable property.125 The decision to set aside 
wetlands as ecological treasures is a decision best left to the locals who would gain 
use from the land. Local, state, and federal programs already exists to buyout houses 
in floodplains and restore the areas to lush wetlands.126 If we are in an environmental 
crisis, then why not take the same approach with private property designated as 
precious wetlands?  
 If Mr. & Mrs. Deaton dig a ditch in Maryland, is that really a risk to the health 
of the environment, or is it a risk to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ sense of 
jurisdictional pride because the Deatons never asked permission?127 If the Sacketts 
build their dream home, does it really help the environment to recreate a wetland 
after it is already filled?  Is it just for the Sacketts to be punished with millions of 
dollars in fines while they assert they have done no wrong? These actions create the 
perception that water resource regulators are worried about their own power and 
ability to exert influence, with environmental concerns a secondary consideration. 
That attitude is what gave rise to a unanimous Opinion in Sackett. Arkansas Fish & 
Game was a next step which confirmed the policy-versus-parcel distinction in 
takings law. 
The Opinion in Koontz may cause exactly what Justice Stevens feared in First 
English and Tahoe-Sierra—that developers would flood administrators with 
challenges and litigation.128 In the ultimate irony, it was Justice Stevens’ Opinion in 
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 125 Id. at 17. 
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ram.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).  
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Tahoe-Sierra which may well have contributed to the facts in cases like Sackett and 
Koontz. When these opportunities arose, Justice Alito did exactly what he was put on 
the Court to accomplish—offer a voice for property owners after a decade of abusing 
property rights. Justice Alito’s voice took Tahoe-Sierra to its logical result, creating 
a potential era of positive results for property developers. We might have seen this 
coming in Sackett, which, oddly-enough, was not cited in Koontz. There is little 
doubt that the CWA itself could be impacted by this decision. But the real loser in 
this situation is the water resource regulator, and that was the strength of Justice 
Alito’s voice all along.  
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